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1. Why revisit board-level representation?  
Since the late 1990s, OECD countries have experienced a wave of international and 
national efforts to reform corporate governance regulation and establish codes of 
‘best practice’. These efforts largely reflect a particular notion of corporate governance 
that includes several elements: investor protection through transparency and legal 
rights for minority shareholders, corporate boards made up of independent outside 
directors, and the importance of ‘shareholder value’ as a criteria for management deci-
sion-making. While brief mention is sometimes about other stakeholders, such as in 
the OECD principles, the mainstream corporate governance debate has largely steered 
clear of any explicit notion of formal modes of employee participation. By contrast, 
for countries such as Germany, these debates have focused growing attention on the 
future of employee representation within corporate boards.
One issue is that codetermination rights for employees are sometimes viewed as 
being antithetical to shareholder value. Some authors cite codetermination as a barrier 
to investors, and thus as a factor promoting greater ownership concentration (Roe 
1999). Others argue more generally that the division of control rights between share-
holders and employees make it unclear to whom managers are accountable (Parkin-
son/Kelly 2001). Recent research has shown that German firms have actually imple-
mented more shareholder-oriented management practices in negotiation with em-
ployee representatives (Höpner 2003b; Jackson 2005a; Jackson et al. 2005; Vitols 
2004), thus raising questions over hybrid forms of governance that modify or combine 
shareholder and stakeholder models. 
Codetermination in Germany also faces challenges in adapting rules rooted in na-
tional law to multinational forms of enterprise. Whereas foreign investors now ac-
count for a growing proportion of ownership among large German corporations, 
employee representation falls under national law that mandate representation only for 
those employees within Germany. Likewise, the German model has proven difficult to 
‘export’ through European law, given the severe divides among member states about 
the desirability of board-level codetermination. Nevertheless, some new Eastern 
European entrants to the European Union have adopted board-level employee repre-
sentation. Similarly, regulations over the Societies Europeanes (SE) outline procedures for 
establishing employee representation in European multinational enterprises.
These debates raise a more fundamental historical question as to why some coun-
tries have systems of board-level codetermination rights and what factors influence 
the cross-national patterns of adoption or non-adoption of employee representation in 
the board?
The analysis will focus on four sets of explanations. One set stresses corporate 
governance factors such as ownership, the legal rights for shareholders, and the degree 
of capital market activity. Corporate governance is often seen as being closely related to 
codetermination. First, some authors have focused on common law and civil law sys-
tems, arguing that civil law systems are more likely to have extensive labour regulation 
(Botero et al. 2004). Second, countries with codetermination are argued to suffer from 
lower levels of capital market development, lesser protection of shareholders, and 
greater concentration of ownership (Pagano/Volpin 2004a; Roe 2003). The corporate 
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governance literature thus stresses the negative sum relationship between shareholder- 
or market-oriented corporate governance arrangements and codetermination.
A third set of explanations examines the role of labour unions in political strug-
gles over codetermination in countries such as Germany (Potthoff 1957). More gener-
ally, differences in the power of unions may be seen as a key explanation of cross-
national differences in codetermination. A fourth set of explanations stresses differ-
ences in political systems across countries. The strength of left-wing political parties 
and the predominance of consensus-oriented rather than majoritarian political systems 
may lead countries to enact codetermination law (Gourevitch 2003).
The analysis in this paper covers 22 OECD countries using cross-sectional data 
from the mid-1990s or multi-year country averages from the post-war period. The 
analysis employs the QCA (qualitative comparative analysis) approach outlined by 
Charles Ragin (Ragin 1987), and later refined through the application of fuzzy-set 
techniques (Ragin 2000). QCA applies boolean logic to analyse the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for an outcome based on set-theoretic relations, e.g. all countries 
with codetermination also have strong unions, or all countries with strong unions also 
have codetermination. This approach is particularly suitable to research designs lim-
ited to a relatively small number of observations, as in cross-country comparisons. 
Another strength is the ability to examine complex causal configurations, where par-
ticular combinations of factors are needed to explain a case. QCA thus offers a bridge 
between more traditional quantitative analysis and case studies. 
The main findings demonstrate two distinct configurations of causal factors lead-
ing to employee codetermination. Both configurations contain a central combination 
of factors: namely, union coordination, consensus-oriented political systems and con-
centrated corporate ownership. The Scandinavian countries also share a stronger un-
ion density and greater power for centre-left forms of government, alongside stronger 
rights for shareholders. Meanwhile, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands follow 
more ‘conservative’ pathways where union density and left political parties are weaker, 
and corporate governance reflects weaker shareholder rights and lesser transparency in 
accounting.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines codetermination in terms of 
board-level representation of employees or labour union officials, and outlines the 
characteristics of codetermination in 22 OECD countries. Section 3 presents a series 
of hypotheses to explain cross-national patterns of codetermination based on corpo-
rate governance, industrial relations, political factors, and legal origins respectively. 
Section 4 presents the data and coding procedures of the QCA analysis, and Section 5 
presents the main empirical results. Section 6 briefly turns back to the cases and inter-
prets the historical development of codetermination in terms of the QCA configura-
tions. Section 7 concludes with the implications of this study for contemporary de-
bates on corporate governance.
2. Board-level employee representation within different configurations 
of capitalism 
Board-level representation of employees may be defined in terms of rights to attend 
and participate in boardroom decisions as full or consultative members. Employee 
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representation can be considered an institutionalized ‘national’ characteristic to the 
extent that such rights are guaranteed by law or through tri-partite and other collective 
agreements.1 Regulations differ in the scope of firms covered, such as public or private 
sector firms, as well as according to the size of firms. Regulations also differ in the 
strength of the rights extended, ranging from rights to information, consultation, and 
codetermination (Knudsen 1995), and the types of decisions to which they apply. The 
proportion of board members may also differ, as does the manner in which they are 
elected. A final issue concerns the structure of the board itself, namely whether coun-
tries have single-tier boards or dual-tier boards, where the supervisory and manage-
ment functions are separated. 
How widespread are employee rights for board-level representation? Table 1 
summarises the basic characteristics of 22 OECD countries, and classifies countries 
along a six-point scale. In total, 14 countries can be seen as negative cases without 
substantial codetermination. Eight countries have no legal provisions for codetermina-
tion of any kind, including the major English-speaking countries of Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, the UK and USA, as well as Japan, South Korea, and Switzerland.2 Italy 
and Portugal also have no substantial codetermination legislation, although their con-
stitutions recognise various rights of workers to participate in management in princi-
ple. Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Spain also fall into the negative group since em-
ployee representation is limited to state-owned enterprises or public service, such as 
railways, public transport or universities. These are assigned a membership score of 
0.3, which suggests that they have ‘some’ codetermination but they are still classified 
as negative cases (being under 0.5) since no privately owned enterprises fall under legal 
requirements for codetermination – the exception being employee representation in 
some privatised state enterprises in Ireland.
Table 1: Codetermination rights in 22 OECD countries: Fuzzy-set memberships 
Fuzzy Score Characteristics Countries 
0 No constitutional rights, and no statutory 
or tri-partite regulation 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New  
Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States 
0.1 Constitutional rights, but no statutory or 
tri-partite regulation 
Italy, Portugal 
0.3 Some statutory or tri-partite regulation of 
public sector firms 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Spain 
0.7 Legal right to attend board at private firms. France 
0.9 Legal rights to nominate some members 
to the board.
Finland, Netherlands 
1 Legal rights to board-level representation 
in private firms. 
Austria, Denmark, Germany,  
Norway, Sweden 
                                                          
1  For the purposes of this paper, purely paternalistic, private contractual arrangements are 
not considered here, nor are the election of employees to boards through share owners-
hip schemes. 
2  In these countries, employee representation on the board of directors is quite rare. The 
election of employee representatives is a matter of contractual agreement or election oc-
curs through employee share ownership. 
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Table 2:  Systems of board-level employee representation – overview
(Sources: European Industrial Relations Observatory; and “Worker representation 
in Europe”, Labour Research Department, LRD booklets, March 1998)
Country Overview Board System 
Austria Austrian companies have supervisory boards which oversee the action 
of the executive board, which runs the business on a day-to-day basis. 
The works council has the right to choose one-third of the representa-
tives of the supervisory board in companies with at least 40 employees. 
Dual
Denmark Employees in Danish companies employing at least 50 employees are 
entitled (though not obliged) to elect at least two representatives on the 
board of directors and up to one-third of the total number of members. 
Dual
Finland In companies with 150 and more staff, employees have the right to 
board-level representation. Much of the detail, however, is left to local 
negotiation between the employer and the trade unions. There must be 
between one and four employee representatives, who should make up 
one-fifth of the body in which they sit. 
Mixed
France In private sector companies, the law provides for two or four representa-
tives of the works council (depending on the number of managers and 
engineers employed and thus the number of electoral colleges for the 
works council) to attend meetings of the board of directors or supervisory 
board in a consultative capacity. In public sector organisations, elected 
employee representatives constitute up to one-third of the board and act 
as full members. Furthermore, in all limited companies, the shareholders 
may voluntarily decide to include elected employee representatives on 
the board. 
Mixed
Germany Employees in companies with 500 employees or more have representa-
tion on the supervisory board. The proportion of worker representatives 
varies from one-third, in companies with between 500 and 2,000 em-
ployees, to one-half, in companies with more than 2,000 workers. In 
these larger companies, the chair in effect represents the shareholders 
and has the casting vote. The one exception is the larger coal or iron and 
steel companies where the chair is independent. In the coal, iron and 
steel industries, the employee representatives can also appoint the "la-
bour director", who is part of the management board. 
Dual
Nether-
lands
Companies with more than 100 employees, a works council and a set 
amount of capital must set up a supervisory board. The supervisory 
board elects its own members and the shareholders, the works council 
and the executive board have the right to recommend new members. 
There is no fixed proportion of employee representatives on the board: a 
works council may uses its right of recommendation, but employees do 
not necessarily have a real representative on the board. According to the 
Civil Code, members of the supervisory board must take the interest of 
the company and the undertaking as a whole into account in the fulfil-
ment of their duties; they are not employee representatives as such. 
Dual
Norway A significant proportion of private sector enterprises are regulated by 
legislation that safeguards employee representation on company boards 
- usually one-third of the total. In some, but far from all, state and mu-
nicipal institutions, political authorities have decided that employees 
should be entitled to be represented on the boards. Similar voluntary 
arrangements may be found in companies that are not covered by the 
traditional legal framework. 
Mixed
Sweden Board-level representation is widespread in Sweden. In almost all com-
panies with more than 25 employees, employees have the right to two 
board members. In companies with more than 1,000 employees en-
gaged in at least two types of businesses, this rises to three board mem-
bers. The employee representatives can never be in a majority. 
Monistic
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The remaining eight countries are classified as positive cases that have board-level 
employee representation rights in various degrees. Here the scope and depth of code-
termination rights still varies considerably (Hans-Boeckler Foundation/European 
Trade Union Institute 2004). Notably, all eight cases are from Western Europe. Table 
2 gives a summary presentation of codetermination rights in these eight countries.
The weakest case of employee representation is France. In that case, codetermi-
nation rights in public sector firms have existed since 1983. In addition, since 1982, 
French law allows two representatives of the works council to attend board or super-
visory board meetings in private firms, albeit in a consultative capacity. This serves 
primarily as an extended right of the works council to information regarding the eco-
nomic affairs of the company, but cannot be considered as rights of codetermination. 
Historically, French unions have shown little interest in board-level representation, 
given their syndicalist traditions (Goetschy 1983; Goyer/Hancke 2005). 
Employee representation in the Netherlands is stronger. Under the so-called 
“structure law”, works councils gain the right to nominate members for election to the 
supervisory board of Dutch firms through a system of “controlled co-optation” (van 
het Kaar 2004). This right can be considered weaker than some other systems of rep-
resentation, since shareholders can still oppose appointments of particular persons. 
Moreover, even up to mid-1990s, relatively few companies made use of their right to 
nominate representatives, although this pattern is changing more recently. Dutch un-
ions supported implementation of the original legislation in 1971. But unions re-
mained relatively aloof from the system and did not actively encourage the use of 
these rights by works councils, since unions considered legal framework as weak and 
ineffective (ibid).  Likewise, the Finnish system also leaves considerable scope for 
negotiation with employers regarding how many and in what boards (e.g. supervisory 
or management) employee representatives will sit (Hans-Boeckler Founda-
tion/European Trade Union Institute 2004). Initial legislation emerged in 1979 and a 
more elaborate system was established in 1990. The negotiated character of represen-
tation means that board-level representation remains only moderately developed. 
The final group constitutes cases of strong employee representation, including 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden. Germany’s system of codetermi-
nation is widely considered to be the strongest and most extensive in the world 
(Streeck 1992). The unique characteristics of the German system constitute the system 
of ‘parity’ representation in firms with over 2,000 employees. Under this system, la-
bour representatives hold 50% of the supervisory board seats. In the iron or coal or 
steel sectors, additional powers are held. For example, the tie-breaking vote held by 
the chairman of the board goes to a neutral person rather than a representative of the 
shareholders. Employees also elect a director to the management board who has re-
sponsibility for personnel affairs. The Austrian and Scandinavian systems are generally 
somewhat weaker. In the case of two-tier boards, representation generally constitutes 
one-third of supervisory board members. However, a detailed comparison and as-
sessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of these systems is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Here the concern is for their broad similarities among countries 
with relatively well-established systems of board-level employee representation. 
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3. Explanations of board-level employee representation  
Why do some countries adopt systems of employee representation in the company 
board? Four main sets of explanations are considered here based on cross-national 
variation in corporate governance, union strength, political systems, and legal systems. 
Corporate Governance 
A large literature now illustrates important linkages between finance, management, 
and industrial relations. Most comparisons contrast two types of corporate govern-
ance systems, such as shareholder vs. stakeholder or outsider vs. insider systems. 
These models reflect strong negative correlations between national capital market 
development (e.g. shareholder rights, market capitalisation, ownership dispersion, or 
merger and acquisition activity), on the one hand, and industrial relations (e.g. co-
ordination of wage bargaining and employment protection law) or employment (e.g. 
employee turnover) on the other (Hall/Gingerich 2004; Höpner 2005).
Countries with more market- or shareholder-oriented corporate governance such 
as the U.S. and UK have weaker provisions for employee voice and more market-
oriented employment patterns (Gospel/Pendleton 2005). Meanwhile, countries out-
side the Anglo-Saxon world remain institutionally more diverse. Although corporate 
governance tends to be less market-oriented, some countries still have market-
oriented characteristics. Likewise, employment tends to be more regulated, but pat-
terns of unionisation or employee participation still differ widely. The diverse patterns 
among this group make it difficult to disentangle how different corporate governance 
characteristics are specifically related to industrial relations (Jackson 2005b).
Several interrelated arguments can be identified. First, codetermination is often 
related to concentrated ownership. Mark Roe argues that only concentrated owners 
can act as an effective counter-weight to employee representatives, since dispersed 
owners cannot easily exercise control rights (Roe 2003). Another related but inverse 
logic is that the demand for industrial democracy by employees was a response to 
concentrated ownership, since owners constituted an identifiable group whose author-
ity should be limited. Second, strong bank-firm relationships may lead to more patient 
or socialised forms of corporate finance and control that are amenable to wider stake-
holder participation (Hall/Soskice 2001b). 
Third, legal rights for shareholders and legal rights for employees may be in-
versely related (Pagano/Volpin 2004a; Pagano/Volpin 2004b).  For example, histori-
cal codifications of the nature of the corporation as a purely private association for 
shareholders may preclude conceptions of employee participation in the corporation 
(Donnelly et al. 2001). Fourth, active capital markets may limit the scope or effective-
ness of employee participation. For example, hostile takeovers may lead to breaches of 
trust with existing stakeholders (Shleifer/Summers 1988) and thus undermine the 
credibility of long-term commitments. In sum, a working baseline hypothesis would 
negatively relate shareholder-oriented corporate governance and employee representa-
tion.
Proposition 1a:  Countries with concentrated ownership of firms and strong bank-
firm relationships are more likely to have board-level representation 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 12. Jg., Heft 3, 2005   259 
than countries with less concentrated ownership and weak bank-firm 
relationships.
Proposition 1b:  Countries with strong legal protection for shareholders and active 
capital markets are less likely to have board-level representation than 
countries with weaker shareholder protection and less active capital 
markets.
Industrial Relations 
More traditional explanations of board-level representation for employees rest on the 
comparative strength of unions in different countries. As unions attempt to gain bet-
ter wages and working conditions for their members, they may demand rights to par-
ticipate in enterprise decision-making (Nagels/Sorge 1977). In Germany of the 1920s, 
radical versions of codetermination were advocated as a first step in part of a broader 
socialist political programme, but these demands eventually led to political compro-
mise aimed to bring more radical unions into the fold of a social democratic capitalist 
social order. In the post-war period, German codetermination re-emerged as both an 
expression and institutionalization of union influence as a way to control the political 
abuse of economic power experienced under Nazism (Jackson 2001).
Codetermination is thus often seen as a political victory of strong unions. Hence, 
the strength of unions is a key factor explaining the existence of codetermination in 
Scandinavian countries, whereas other countries lack unions with the size and strength 
to win political struggles over codetermination.
Considerable controversy exists over how to conceptualise and measure the 
strength of labour unions. Union density is the normally seen as the central indicator. 
Membership constitutes a primary power resource that is correlated with greater cen-
tralization of collective bargaining and political influence of labour (Vernon 2006). 
Density is only loosely linked with the rates of coverage under collective bargaining 
agreements, as well as individual social rights. While density rates have changed greatly 
over the last several decades as union membership declines, the relative rates of den-
sity among OECD countries is quite stable and gives a robust measure of comparative 
differences.
However, this argument about unions is incomplete. The structure of unions and 
the patterns of collective bargaining also matter. The organizational structure of un-
ions can be differentiated along three ideal types: class, occupation, and enterprise 
models (Dore 1996; Streeck 1993). These different types of union structure influence 
employee orientation toward internal participation in corporate decisions or external 
control through collection action (Aguilera/Jackson 2003).
Craft unions may prefer to influence firms’ decisions externally with the threat of 
collective action (e.g. strikes). Craft unions recruit members based on occupation and 
may find employee identification with a particular firm as a threat to their own inter-
ests, as is often cited in the British case. Craft unions stress a separation from manage-
rial responsibility, and employee representation is independent of management, pre-
served in strict separation from co-operative institutions that engage employees in 
firms’ decision-making. Conversely, enterprise-based unions recruit members among 
employees within a particular firm and may be more inclined to participate in com-
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pany decision-making in the interest of securing long-term employment and internal 
promotion prospects, as in Japan. However, enterprise unions are also likely to be too 
isolated and uncoordinated to articulate a political demand for legal rights to board-
level representation. 
Broader class-based forms of unions may be best situated for board-level em-
ployee participation. Class-based unions may share with craft unions a deep scepticism 
of enterprise-based representation as potentially competing with broader forms of 
worker solidarity. Some politicised forms of unionism, such as in France or Italy, have 
proven quite hostile to codetermination. Yet class-based unions may still have strong 
interests in pursuing board-level representation. Class-based unions are most likely to 
advocate broad ideological programmes of socialism or economic democracy. More-
over, such unions may see enterprise-based representation as a useful extension of 
union influence into firms, particularly where collective bargaining takes place on in a 
multi-employer framework. For example, industry-wide collective bargaining is rela-
tively remote to individual enterprises and may leave a gap to be filled at the enterprise 
level (Clegg 1976). Firm-level employee participation, such as works councils, may 
help to interpret and monitor the implementation of collective agreements. Board-
level representation may also be easier where firms fall under centralised industry-wide 
or national-level collective bargaining agreements. Employee representatives in the 
board are relatively remote from negotiations over the distribution of wages, since 
these are partially shifted outside the gambit of individual firms and into the sphere of 
multi-employer negotiation.
Thus, the relationship between unions and board-level representation appears to 
have two elements. Unions must be sufficiently strong in terms of membership to win 
political battles over codetermination, but their internal structure must also facilitate 
articulation of worker interests that are in line with enterprise-based participation. 
Here encompassing class-based forms of unionism may be the most congenial to 
dealing with the contradictions of employee participation. While no clear indices exist 
to compare the degree of different forms of unionism, a proxy for encompassing 
unions can be taken from various indices that assess the degree of centralisation in 
collective bargaining or ‘coordination’ among unions and employers. 
Proposition 2:  Countries with strong unions and coordinated collective bargaining 
are more likely to have board-level representation than countries with 
weak unions and less coordinated collective bargaining.
Political Systems 
While the first two hypotheses look at the owners and employees of the corporation 
in isolation, employee representation may be the result of struggles between these 
groups in the political arena. The institutional characteristics of the political arena may 
therefore be an important determinate of outcomes in struggles for corporate control 
(Fligstein 1990; Gourevitch 2003; Roe 2003; Streeck/Yamamura 2001). 
Employee representation is often linked to the strength of left-wing political par-
ties. In countries where ‘social democracy’ is strong, the political left may attempt to 
democratise control rights over corporate decision making as part of a broader social-
ist or social democratic political agenda (Roe 2003). Meanwhile, political movements 
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against corporate power in the liberal U.S. case during the time of the New Deal also 
set out to tame and regulate markets, fragmenting the concentration of economic 
power, but fell far short of attempting to legislate participation rights for employees 
(Roe 1994).
The politics of corporate governance may also reflect complex cross-class coali-
tions.3 For example, German unions sided with leftist political parties in supporting 
‘organized capital’ such as banks in Weimar Germany, but following World War II 
unions and left parties sided more with small shareholders in trying to curtail the eco-
nomic power of large industrialists (Höpner 2004). Likewise, the first codetermination 
legislation in post-war Germany was passed under a conservative Christian Democ-
ratic (CDU) Union government. The CDU faced an exceptional need to build legiti-
macy for the post-Nazi political regime and satisfy pressures from unions and Allied 
occupation authorities—thus drawing upon the social democratic legacy of the Wei-
mar period.
Another political argument stresses political institutions themselves, such as the 
nature of the electoral system and competition between political parties. Political insti-
tutions favour certain kinds of coalitions regarding corporate governance (Pa-
gano/Volpin 2004b). A key element here is whether or not electoral and political sys-
tems are majoritarian or consensus-based (Lijphart 1999). Majoritarian systems are 
affected by small swings in electoral results, whereas consensus-based systems inte-
grate more interest groups. Consensus systems are more supportive of credible com-
mitments toward cooperation among corporate stakeholders, since public policy may 
be less volatile (Hall/Soskice 2001a). Perhaps more fundamentally, state traditions 
based on strong consensus and sharing of power between public and private domains 
may influence the use of public power to institutionalise stakeholder participation in 
private corporations (Crouch 1993).
Proposition 3:  Countries with strong leftist political parties and consensus-oriented 
political systems are more likely to have board-level representation 
than countries with weak leftist parties and majoritarian political sys-
tems.
Legal Systems 
A final explanation relates to the nature of legal systems.  The legal origins theory 
emerged in debates about differences in corporate ownership and finance, stressing 
the central distinction between common law and civil law traditions for investor pro-
tection (La Porta et al. 1998). This theory has recently been extended to the regulation 
of labour, arguing that civil law countries with French and Scandinavian legal origin 
have higher levels of labour relations than do common law countries (Botero et al. 
2004). Common law is characterised by juries, independent judges and judicial discre-
tion, rather than codes. Common law countries are thus seen as relying more on mar-
ket and contractual modes of governance. Civil law traditions use more regulation to 
                                                          
3  The concept of corporate governance as coalition has important roots in economics 
(Aoki 1984), but also in sociological and political models of the firm (Aguilera/Jackson 
2003; Cyert/March 1963; Höpner 2005). 
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govern business activity, reflecting greater intervention in private economic organisa-
tion through statutory means.
Proposition 4:  Countries with civil law traditions are more likely to have board-level 
representation than countries with common law traditions. 
4.  The QCA approach: Data and method  
Evaluating these four propositions presents methodological challenges that are well 
known in comparative research. A small N problem arises, since the number of 
OECD countries is small relative to the number of potential explanatory variables and 
do not permit statistical analysis (Lijphart 1971). Moreover, statistical models make 
assumptions about how variables combine based on their marginal effects while hold-
ing other factors constant based on their average value. This assumption is at odds 
with theories of institutional complementarity (Aoki 2001) that view institutions as 
having contingent effects based on the presence or absence of other institutions. Out-
comes may result from a particular conjunction of multiple variables (Ragin 2000). 
As a consequence, comparative research is often based on country case studies 
with rich empirical detail, but limited generalisation. In an effort to bridge the gap 
between cases studies and statistical analysis, this paper employs a relatively new ap-
proach of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) based on the logic of fuzzy sets. The 
QCA approach has been advocated for small-N research designs (5-50 cases), and is 
increasingly applied throughout the social sciences (Koenig-Archibugi 2004; Kogut et 
al. 2004).
QCA methods are tools for making inferences about necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an outcome based on Boolean algebra (Ragin 2000). Fuzzy-sets over-
come the limitations of Boolean sets, based on dichotomous presence or absence of a 
variable, to situations where cases display different degrees of property. To conduct 
the analysis, empirical indicators are re-scored between 0 and 1 according to the de-
gree of membership in the conceptual category. A membership score of 1 represents a 
case that is ‘fully in’ the category and 0 is ‘fully out.’ 0.5 represents the transition point 
where a case is ‘neither in, nor out.’ In this paper, a six-value fuzzy set was used with 
the values 1, 0.9, 0.7, 0.3, 0.1 and 0. The country with the lowest value on each vari-
able was assigned a score of zero and the country with the highest value was assigned 
a score of one. All other countries received intermediate values.
Data for 22 OECD countries was compiled from various available sources to ex-
plore the four propositions (see Appendix for sources). Corporate governance meas-
ures included capital market activity, mergers and acquisitions, legal protection for 
investors, the quality of accounting rules, ownership concentration and ownership by 
banks. Data on industrial relations include union density and a measure of coordina-
tion in collective bargaining. Political variables included the rule by centre-left gov-
ernments, the proportionality of electoral systems, and the number of active political 
parties. Most of the data relate to the mid-1990s, but averages taken from longer time-
series where possible. The data set is less than ideal, since institutional characteristics 
should be measured at the time when codetermination laws were passed, which often 
date to the 1950s or 1970s. The QCA analysis should thus be seen as an exploratory 
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comparison to be elaborated in dialogue with historical evidence from the various 
cases.
The fuzzy membership values are reported in Table 3. Three aggregated variables 
were also constructed based on joint membership along several variables. ‘CG-market’ 
is a measure of the degree of capital market activity based on measures of equity mar-
ket training and mergers activity. ‘CG-legal’ is a measure of the legal aspects of corpo-
rate governance based on investor protection and accounting variables. ‘Consensus’ 
measure the consensus-orientation of the political system based on proportional elec-
toral systems and a high number of effective political parties. Since few countries have 
predominately centre-left governments or highly consensual political systems, the 
variables for centre-left government and consensual political systems were also re- 
coded using the square root of the original score. This modified score lowers the 
threshold of membership without affecting the score of full or non-members. This 
procedure is equivalent of ‘diluting’ the conceptual category giving membership in the 
set of countries with some minimum level of X (see Ragin 2000).
Table 3  Fuzzy membership scores:  22 OECD countries 
country emp-board
cg-
market 
accoun-
ting investor cg-legal
con-
centra-
tion bank union 
coordi-
nation
centre-
left
consen-
sus
com-
monlaw 
Australia 0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.57 0.32 1 
Austria 1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 1 0 0.9 1 0.41 0.55 0 
Belgium 0.3 0 0.3 0 0 1 1 0.9 0.3 0 0.84 0 
Canada 0 0.9 0.9 1 0.9 0.3 0 0.3 0 0.91 0.32 1 
Denmark 1 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.9 0 1 1 0.91 0.95 0 
Finland 0.9 0.3 1 0.7 0.7 0.7 1 0.9 1 1 0.95 0 
France 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 1 0.1 0.3 0.57 0 0 
Germany 1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.9 1 0.3 0.7 0.57 0.84 0 
Greece 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 1 0.3 0.1 0 0.41 0.32 0 
Ireland 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.3 0 0.7 0.3 0 0.84 1 
Italy 0.1 0 0.3 0.1 0.1 1 0 0.7 0.3 0.57 0.84 0 
Japan 0 0 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.3 0 0.84 0 
Netherlands 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 0 0.3 0.7 0.41 0.95 0 
N. Zealand 0 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0 0.3 0.3 0.82 0 1 
Norway 1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9 1 0.91 0.84 0 
Portugal 0.1 0.1 0 0.7 0 1 0.7 0.3 0.3 0 0.84 0 
S. Korea 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.7 0 0 
Spain 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 1 1 0 0.3 0.57 0.55 0 
Sweden 1 0.7 1 0.7 0.7 0.7 1 1 1 1 0.84 0 
Switzerland 0 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.91 0.95 0 
UK 0 0.9 1 1 1 0.1 0.3 0.7 0 0.41 0.32 1 
USA 0 0.9 0.7 1 0.7 0 0 0.1 0 0.91 0.32 1 
The first step in the analysis is to look for all causal conditions with membership 
scores that are consistently greater than or equal to outcome membership scores. If a 
causal condition appears in all of the cases (e.g. all countries with codetermination 
have strong unions), then this condition passes a test of necessity. A probabilistic 
interpretation can be made to take into account statistical significance of a benchmark 
proportion of cases. In this paper, tests for ‘necessary conditions’ were based on a 
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proportion of positive cases exceeding 70% and achieve a significance of .10. A sec-
ond step is to examine sufficiency by comparing membership scores in the outcome 
with the score of all logically possible combinations of causal conditions. A condition 
or set of conditions may be considered sufficient for an outcome if membership in the 
cause is consistently less than or equal to membership in the outcome (e.g. all coun-
tries with strong unions have codetermination). The fs/QCA software helps generate 
a parsimonious model by eliminating those combinations of factors that pass the test 
of sufficiency, but are logically redundant. The fs/QCA software may incorporate 
simplifying assumptions if missing cases are viewed as being theoretically irrelevant. 
This analysis includes no simplifying assumptions and all missing cases were coded as 
negative outcomes. 
In this paper, the analysis of sufficiency incorporates an fs/QCA algorithm that 
refines the strictly proportional analysis mentioned above. Rather than the proportion 
of cases, Ragin proposes looking at a measure of consistency based on the percentage 
of membership in a cause that is consistent (e.g. less than or equal) with an outcome 
(Ragin 2004). A consistency score of 70 percent or greater more was interpreted as a 
benchmark for a cause being sufficient for an outcome.
It is worth noting that the hypotheses outlined in the previous section were writ-
ten in terms of links between single institutional features and the likelihood of there 
being employee representation. The QCA analysis actually tests each variable indi-
vidually for being both a necessary condition or a sufficient condition for employee 
representation. Furthermore, the QCA analysis of sufficient conditions examines all 
possible combinations of the independent variables in an inductive fashion. QCA thus 
incorporates the written hypotheses, but actually explores a wider set of hypotheses 
based on the different combinations of variables.
5.  Results 
Table 4 reports the fuzzy-set tests for whether the presence or absence of corporate 
governance, union and political variables are necessary conditions for codetermina-
tion. The presence of a condition is indicated with CAPITAL letters, and the absence 
by lower case letters. The coefficients show the proportion of cases where member-
ship in the cause was lower than membership in the outcome based on the 14 cases 
where score codetermination exceeds zero. If this proportion exceeds 70%, a P value 
describes the probability whether the proportion is statistically significant based on the 
number of cases.
Necessary Conditions 
None of the corporate governance variables proved to be necessary for board-level 
employee representation. The proportion of cases without strong capital market activ-
ity was less than half. Likewise, the proportion of cases with weak legal protection was 
less than half. An important implication is that the absence of capital market pressures 
or legal rights for shareholders is not a necessary prerequisite for codetermination. 
Several cases of strong codetermination (e.g. Sweden, Finland and Norway) have 
moderately strong investor rights and active capital markets. These cases suggest the 
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potential compatibility of employee participation within a moderately market-oriented 
corporate governance regime.
Table 4   Results of fuzzy-set tests: Necessary conditions for board-level employee 
representation
 N Cause     Observed Binomial 
Variable   >= Outcome Proportion p 
cg-market 7 0.50  
CG-MARKET 3 0.21  
cg-legal 6 0.43  
CG-LEGAL 4 0.29  
concentration 1 0.07  
CONCENTRATION 8 0.57  
bank 7 0.50  
BANK 8 0.57  
union 6 0.43  
UNION 7 0.50  
coordination 7 0.50  
COORDINATION 10 0.71      0.584 
centre-left 6 0.43  
CENTRE-LEFT 5 0.36  
electproportion 7 0.50  
ELECTPROPORTION 9 0.64  
parties 4 0.29  
PARTIES 8 0.57  
Consensus 5 0.36  
CONSENSUS 8 0.57  
commonlaw 13 0.93      0.047* 
COMMONLAW 1 0.07  
Number of Cases Tested (Outcome > 0): 14 ( 63.6% of Total)
Test Proportion:  0.70
             *p < 0.10
Turning to ownership, the proportion of cases of codetermination with strong bank 
ownership was only 57%. Here Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands lack strong 
bank ownership. The proportion of cases with concentrated ownership was also 57%. 
A visual inspection of the concentration data in Figure 1 shows that most of the non-
consistent cases are very near misses. Sweden has strong codetermination, but only 
moderate ownership concentration compared to countries such as Italy or Portugal. 
Denmark, Germany and Norway also have very high levels of concentration. The 
clustering of cases as ‘near misses’ could suggest that some minimum threshold level 
of ownership concentration is a necessary condition for board-level employee repre-
sentation.
Union density and coordinated collective bargaining failed to meet the test pro-
portions as necessary conditions for codetermination. Germany and the Netherlands 
are major exceptions, since these countries lack the very high union density found in 
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Scandinavia. Likewise, France has very low union density despite having a weak form 
of codetermination. Coordinated collective bargaining was present in 71% of cases 
with codetermination, although the proportion failed to be statistically significant 
given the number of cases. Relative to the Scandinavian countries, Germany, the 
Netherlands and France have slightly less coordinated bargaining. But as with owner-
ship concentration, these cases are rather near misses and might suggest that a lower 
threshold of union coordination might pass the test for necessity. 
Figure 1: Employee representation and ownership concentration 
No political factors passed the test as being necessary for codetermination. Strong 
centre-left governments were absent in Austria and the Netherlands. Germany and 
France also have weaker left party power than other Scandinavian countries. Consen-
sual political systems were found in 57% of cases with codetermination. France is 
again a strong exception case of codetermination in the context of a highly dispropor-
tional electoral system. 
Turning to legal systems, common law was absent in 13 of the 14 cases of 
codetermination. Ireland was the one exception, where employee representation exists 
in state-run or formerly state enterprises. All other cases of employee representation 
were among countries with various civil law traditions. Thus, the analysis suggests that 
the absence of common law is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for employee 
representation. However, it is difficult to say whether common law has a strong in-
compatibility with employee representation or whether common law exerts indirect 
effects through unobserved variables. For example, common law correlates strongly 
with other hypothesised factors, such as investor protection, electoral systems and 
patterns of unionism. In particular, given the limited diversity of cases, no common 
law county also has strong coordinated collective bargaining that would permit a di-
rect test of these two competing hypotheses, as shall be discussed in the conclusion.
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Sufficient Conditions 
The second analysis turns to sufficient conditions for board-level employee represen-
tation. Table 5 presents tests for the sufficiency in the form of truth tables. The truth 
tables are based on a dichotomous coding of the fuzzy set membership, but the set 
theoretic relationship is still assessed in terms of sum of consistent fuzzy membership 
in the cause as a proportion of total membership in the outcome. A threshold of 70% 
was chosen to assess cases as being consistent. Causal conditions passing this mark are 
considered as ‘almost always sufficient’ to produce a particular outcome. In addition, 
the fs/QCA software calculates a measure of coverage as the ratio of the sum of con-
sistent Xi to the sum of Yi. Coverage thus shows the proportion of total membership 
in outcome was explained by the causal condition. Where solutions have multiple 
terms, fs/QCA also calculates unique coverage as the coverage that does not overlap 
with other solution terms. 
Table 5: Truth tables: Corporate governance, industrial relations and politics 
Table 5A: Individual conditions 
union weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
0 1.02 12 0 0.32 0.77 
1 0.9 10 0 0.58 0.51 
coordination weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
0 1.12 15 0 0.22 0.90 
1 0.88 7 1 0.80 0.36 
centre-left weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
1 1.14 14 0 0.51 0.58 
0 0.86 8 0 0.38 0.73 
consensus weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
1 1.20 14 0 0.55 0.55 
0 0.80 8 0 0.33 0.81 
cg-legal weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
0 1.08 12 0 0.47 0.64 
1 0.92 10 0 0.46 0.67 
cg-market weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
0 1.16 14 0 0.44 0.66 
1 0.84 8 0 0.50 0.64 
bank weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
0 1.16 13 0 0.32 0.72 
1 0.85 9 0 0.57 0.47 
concentration weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
1 1.28 14 0 0.56 0.50 
0 0.72 8 0 0.28 0.87 
Table 5A reports the results of each independent variable in isolation. The only sig-
nificant result was coordinated collective bargaining. All 7 cases of strong coordina-
tion (a score of 0.5 or above) also had board-level employee representation (a score of 
0.5 or above) and achieved an overall consistency of 79.4%. Thus, coordinated collec-
tive bargaining passes the test as a sufficient condition and achieves very high cover-
age score of 0.865. The only case of strong codetermination without coordinated bar-
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gaining was France. Notably, the results for legal origin show that while the absence of 
common law was a necessary condition for codetermination, civil law is not in itself a 
sufficient condition. As such, legal origins have relatively little weight in explaining 
positive cases of codetermination, but may help explain the absence of codetermina-
tion among common law countries.
Table 5B: Joint conditions by category 
Unionization 
union coordination weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
0 0 1.34 10 0 0.27 0.88 
1 0 0.85 5 0 0.27 0.92 
1 1 1.12 5 1 0.80 0.35 
0 1 0.69 2 0 0.60 0.69 
Politics
centre-left consensus weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
1 1 1.26 8 0 0.65 0.45 
0 1 1.06 6 0 0.44 0.73 
1 0 0.97 6 0 0.35 0.81 
0 0 0.71 2 0 0.49 0.82 
Corporate Governance 
cg-
market
cg-
legal
concen-
tration
bank weight number empboard yconsist nconsist 
0 0 1 0 1.83 4 0 0.48 0.69 
0 0 1 1 1.73 4 0 0.53 0.69 
1 1 0 0 1.42 4 0 0.19 0.91 
0 1 1 1 1.05 2 1 0.74 0.52 
1 1 1 1 1.09 2 1 0.78 0.47 
0 0 0 0 0.92 1 0 0.30 0.85 
0 0 0 1 0.75 1 0 0.50 0.68 
0 1 0 0 0.95 1 0 0.29 0.86 
0 1 1 0 1.085 1 0 0.41 0.78 
1 0 0 0 0.80 1 0 0.35 0.83 
1 0 1 0 0.92 1 1 0.70 0.52 
0 1 0 1 0.64 0 na 0.58 0.63 
1 0 0 1 0.51 0 na 0.73 0.53 
1 0 1 1 0.75 0 na 0.82 0.59 
1 1 0 1 0.68 0 na 0.55 0.65 
1 1 1 0 0.92 0 na 0.52 0.67 
Table 5B presents truth tables joining the four corporate governance, two industrial 
relations, and two political variables respectively. No combination of the political vari-
ables passed the test for sufficiency. However, among industrial relations variables, the 
combination of high bargaining coordination and a high level of union membership 
passes the test of sufficiency and displays a very high rate of coverage: 
UNION * COORDINATION ? EMPBOARD 
(solution coverage: 0.700, solution consistency: 0.795) 
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The four corporate governance variables entail 16 possible configurations, and five of which 
have no empirical cases. Two existing configurations passed the tests for sufficiency: 
CG-LEGAL*CONCENTRATION*BANK+ 
(coverage: 0.371, unique coverage: 0.348, consistency: 0.767) 
CG-MARKET*cg-legal*CONCENTRATION*bank 
(coverage: 0.213, unique coverage: 0.191, consistency: 0.704) 
? EMPBOARD 
solution coverage: 0.562 
solution consistency: 0.781 
The first covers the cases of Finland, Norway, Sweden and France, whereas the sec-
ond covers the case of Denmark. Neither corporate governance configuration covers 
Austria, Germany or the Netherlands. Overall the total coverage of the corporate 
governance model is lower than the industrial relations model, suggesting lesser ex-
planatory weight. The corporate governance results also partially contradict our hy-
potheses. In particular, the first solution includes strong legal protection for investors, 
rather than weak protection. 
Table 5C: Combined conditions 
uni-
on
coor
dina
tion
cent
re-
left
con-
sen-
sus
cg-
mar-
ket
cg-
le-
gal
con-
centr-
ation
bank weight N emp-
board
ycon-
sist
ncon-
sist
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2.33 2 0 0.02 1.00 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.36 2 1 0.75 0.29 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.98 1 0 0.35 1.00 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.97 1 0 0.10 0.90 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 2.28 1 0 0.47 0.87 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1.38 1 0 0.04 1.00 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1.58 1 0 0.16 1.00 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1.30 1 1 0.81 0.72 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1.52 1 0 0.58 0.81 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1.47 1 0 0.20 0.87 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2.13 1 0 0.59 0.69 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1.45 1 1 0.73 0.54 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1.62 1 0 0.13 1.00 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1.86 1 0 0.42 0.84 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1.74 1 0 0.34 0.89 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1.75 1 0 0.03 1.00 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1.45 1 0 0.34 0.86 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2.38 1 0 0.63 0.62 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1.57 1 1 0.75 0.31 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1.77 1 1 0.78 0.28 
**All 236 other possible configurations have no empirical cases 
Table 5C presents the truth table for eight independent variables. The variable 
‘common law’ was dropped in the remaining analysis of sufficiency, since any neces-
sary condition will always appear in all combinations of sufficient conditions. Note 
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that the eight remaining variables yield 28 = 256 possible configurations. Of these 
256, only 20 configurations have empirical cases. Increasing the number of variables 
relative to cases entails that each case is likely to become increasingly unique. Con-
sequently, the QCA results become less robust because no other cases are suffi-
ciently similar to falsify a particular configuration and thus even random data might 
produce consistent results (Marx 2005). To cope with these restrictions, a certain 
ratio of variables to cases should be maintained in QCA. For an analysis of 22 coun-
tries, five or less independent variables is recommended. While six independent 
variables can be used with only a small likelihood of error, increasing to seven or 
more variables greatly increases the risk of finding random configurations that pass 
the test for sufficiency (ibid).
The subsequent analysis thus incorporates a smaller number of variables. Table 6 
presents results using the two industrial relations and two political variables with dif-
ferent combinations of corporate governance variables. Table 6A-6D includes each of 
the four corporate governance variables individually. Table 6A shows that including 
legal regulation results in two significant configurations. The combination of union 
coordination, consensual political systems and the absence of legal protection for 
investors passed the test of sufficiency. This solution covers the cases of Austria, 
Germany and the Netherlands. Likewise, the combination of strong union member-
ship, union coordination, centre-left government and consensual political systems 
passed the test of sufficiency. This solution covers the Scandinavian cases of Den-
mark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. France is not covered by this model. Table 6B 
shows two results identical to model 6A, but with capital market activity replacing 
investor protection. Table 6C and Table 6D report results for ownership concentra-
tion and bank ownership respectively, but these have lower levels of coverage. Next, 
all pair-wise combinations of corporate governance variables were tested, and the 
solution with the highest coverage reported in Table 6E. This model is also identical 
to Table 6A, but with the presence of high ownership concentration in both configu-
rations.
Table 6  Results of fuzzy-set tests: Sufficient conditions for board-level employee 
representation
Model A:  
EMPBOARD = UNION + COORDINATION + CENTRE-LEFT + CONSENSUS + CG-LEGAL 
COORDINATION*CONSENSUS*cg-legal+
(coverage: 0.499744    unique coverage: 0.217722    consistency: 0.801720) 
UNION*COORDINATION*CENTRE-LEFT*CONSENSUS       
(coverage: 0.516103    unique coverage: 0.234081    consistency: 0.851668) 
? EMPBOARD 
solution coverage: 0.733825  
solution consistency: 0.833994  
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Model B:
EMPBOARD = UNION + COORDINATION + CENTRE-LEFT + CONSENSUS + CG-MARKET 
COORDINATION*SOMECONSENSUS*cg-market+              
(coverage: 0.499744    unique coverage: 0.217722    consistency: 0.801720) 
UNION*COORDINATION*CENTRE-LEFT*CONSENSUS       
(coverage: 0.516103    unique coverage: 0.234081    consistency: 0.851668) 
? EMPBOARD 
solution coverage: 0.733825  
solution consistency: 0.833994 
Model C: 
EMPBOARD = UNION + COORDINATION + CENTRE-LEFT + CONSENSUS + CONCENTRATION 
UNION*COORDINATION*CENTRE-LEFT*CONSENSUS*CONCENTRATION       
(coverage: 0.477153 consistency: 0.841479)  
? EMPBOARD 
solution coverage: 0.477153  
solution consistency: 0.841479  
Model D: 
EMPBOARD = UNION + COORDINATION + CENTRE-LEFT + CONSENSUS + BANK 
UNION*COORDINATION*CENTRE-LEFT*SOMECONSENSUS
(solution coverage: 0.516103, solution consistency: 0.851668) 
? EMPBOARD 
Model E:
EMPBOARD = UNION + COORDINATION + CENTRE-LEFT + CONSENSUS  
+ CG-LEGAL + CONCENTRATION 
COORDINATION*CONSENSUS*cg-legal*CONCENTRATION +
(coverage: 0.499744    unique coverage: 0.217722    consistency: 0.801721)  
UNION*COORDINATION*CENTRE-LEFT*CONSENSUS*CONCENTRATION       
(coverage: 0.477153    unique coverage: 0.195130    consistency: 0.841479)  
? EMPBOARD 
solution coverage: 0.694874  
solution consistency: 0.826305  
Model F:
EMPBOARD = UNION + COORDINATION + CENTRE-LEFT + SOMECONSENSUS  
+ CG-MARKET + CG-LEGAL + CONCENTRATION + BANK 
UNION*COORDINATION*CENTRE-LEFT*CONSENSUS*CG-LEGAL*CONCENTRATION*BANK+                 
(coverage: 0.247191, unique coverage: 0.213483, consistency: 0.785714)  
union*COORDINATION*CENTRE-LEFT*CONSENSUS*cg-market*cg-legal*CONCENTRATION*BANK+
(coverage: 0.120225, unique coverage: 0.052809, consistency: 0.727891)  
union*coordination*CENTRE-LEFT*consensus*cg-market*CG- LEGAL*CONCENTRATION*BANK+       
(coverage: 0.120225, unique coverage: 0.075281, consistency: 0.809798)  
UNION*COORDINATION*CENTRE-LEFT*CONSENSUS*CG-MARKET*cg-legal*CONCENTRATION*bank
(coverage: 0.157303, unique coverage: 0.146067, consistency: 0.777778)  
solution coverage: 0.555056  
solution consistency: 0.875886  
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Finally, Table 6F shows the results of the model including all eight variables. Given 
the problem of case uniqueness, this model results in a less parsimonious solution. 
For example, Denmark appears as distinct from the other Scandinavian cases. One 
configuration now encompasses France, which is characterised by low union member-
ship and coordination, the absence of a consensual political system, but strong centre-
left government, concentrated ownership and banks. Austria and the Netherlands are 
left unexplained. 
6. From variables back to cases? 
Comparing the results of the various fuzzy sets analyses leaves some puzzle as to 
which model is the ‘best’ explanation of board-level representation of employees. 
QCA models can be compared in terms of their coverage of cases, and the consis-
tency of their predictions. However, a trade-off may still exist between theoretical 
complexity and parsimony. The most parsimonious set of sufficient conditions was 
the single variable of coordinated collective bargaining. The coordinated collective 
bargaining is related to arguments about the encompassing nature of union member-
ship, as well as the compatibility of enterprise representation with collective bargain-
ing. This factor proved to be sufficient in 7 out of the 8 key cases, the exception being 
France. This single factor sets countries with codetermination apart from the Anglo-
Saxon, Mediterranean and East Asian countries in the OECD.
At the other extreme, the most complex solution including all 8 independent va-
riables (Table 6F) was less satisfactory, since both Austria and the Netherlands could 
not be explained consistently in terms of all variables. Here the large number of 
variables increases the uniqueness of each case and results in a large number of con-
figurations with ‘missing cases’ that cannot be minimised.
The model in Table 6E seems to offer a good balance of parsimony and com-
plexity. This model sacrifices some degree of coverage compared to the coordination 
variable alone, but still contains seven of the eight cases of strong codetermination. 
Moreover, the model is theoretically richer, since it integrates the different theoretical 
arguments into a conjunctural model of causation that suggests potential historical 
interactions between the variables. Specifically, this model suggests two broad paths to 
board-level employee representation.
The first pattern is shown in Figure 2 and groups the Scandinavian countries of 
Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark around a number of key characteristics. Un-
ions density is very strong and collective bargaining is highly coordinated, often at a 
national level. Union influence is enhanced by the presence of strong centre-left gov-
ernments with participation from Social Democratic political parties, and those parties 
are integrated into strongly consensus-based political systems that support credible 
commitments and stable cross-class coalitions. The combination of these four factors 
are all in line with the hypotheses 2 and 3, and act jointly as sufficient conditions. 
These countries also have concentrated corporate ownership. However, this group 
include cases of both strong legal protection (Sweden, Norway, Finland) and weaker 
protection for shareholders (Denmark). 
The Swedish case provides a useful illustration. Swedish unions and leftist parties 
were generally very strong. Meanwhile, corporate ownership is highly concentrated 
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among families. Large firms are relatively few in number, and focused on the export 
industry. Part of the political compromise, going back to the 1930s, was the support 
of strong banks and a taxation regime that would help to preserve concentrated pri-
vate ownership but integrate this within a strong ‘organised’ national system of gov-
ernance (Högfeldt 2004). Ownership in Sweden thereby remained highly concen-
trated, and the small and identifiable corporate elite was an important element sup-
porting coordinated collective bargaining and political consensus (Reiter 2003). 
Meanwhile, the centralised Swedish labour unions and the Social Democratic party 
focused their attention on building the welfare state, but left issues of participation at 
the enterprise level free from state intervention. This changed in the 1970s, as de-
mands for codetermination emerged during wildcat strikes by the miners’ union di-
rected at issues of authority in the workplace and the understanding that managers had 
too much unilateral control. While employers strictly opposed these plans, the alliance 
between the union federation and Social Democratic party was strong enough to pass 
codetermination rights, although they fell far short of more ambitious goals of collec-
tive ownership through the controversial wage earner funds (Blythe 2004). Today, 
Swedish codetermination is considered as a cooperative and effective institution (Lev-
inson 2000). 
Figure 2: Employee representation and Scandinavian configuration 
The second pattern is shown in Figure 3, grouping Austria, the Netherlands and Ger-
many as a more ‘conservative’ route to codetermination. Similar to Scandinavia, these 
countries also have strong union coordination and consensus-based political systems 
that help to integrate labour into political compromises. However, these countries 
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don’t necessarily have strong union membership or strong centre-left government to the 
same extent. The common feature among the three countries is the absence of strong 
shareholder rights. Here political compromise may have involved the integration of 
labour into the firm, but at the price of weak protection for small shareholders and 
weaker information disclosure and accounting rules. Here large owners, such as German 
banks or family-owned enterprises, were likely to have opposed such corporate govern-
ance measures that opened up the firm to outsider control.
Figure 3: Employee representation and Germanic configuration 
In Austria and Germany, in particular, the formation of broad cross-class coalitions 
was an important part of democratisation following their defeat in World War II. The 
political demand for codetermination in Germany arose as a way to prevent the politi-
cal abuse of economic power by industrialists in heavy industry under Nazi rule. The 
unions and left parties at the time were not powerful enough to impose codetermina-
tion throughout the economy. In this sense, the early codetermination laws were not 
an unqualified victory of the left, but a measure implemented by Christian Democratic 
government to gain legitimacy for prevailing patterns of corporate ownership, namely 
concentrated ownership by banks and families. In fact, the German Social Democratic 
Party has historically been the advocate of curtailing the power of banks and increas-
ing information disclosure of firms (Höpner 2003a).  In short, these characteristics of 
the German corporate governance may likely reflect the weakness of the left, rather 
than its strength as is often claimed (Roe 2003). The case of the Netherlands shares 
some important similarities with Germany. Dutch collective bargaining is also coordi-
nated and politics is perhaps even more consensual. Ownership concentration is less 
and the Netherlands did not suffer the same political abuses of economic power dur-
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ing wartime, perhaps leading to less need to tame large owners. Moreover, Dutch 
unions were historically more sceptical about codetermination. These subtle differ-
ences may help explain the weaker system of codetermination in the Netherlands. 
France remains as puzzle in this analysis, as it shares almost none of the charac-
teristics with the aforementioned groups. Codetermination in France seems to have 
been the result of a strong left party acting within a very disproportional electoral 
system. Under these conditions, the left was able to push through weak codetermina-
tion legislation without much support from either the weak and fragmented unions or 
large-scale owners. This rather unique set of factors may help explain the weakness 
and lack of legitimacy of codetermination in France. This also presents an interesting 
puzzle as to why the French Socialist party attempted to implement codetermination 
and also suggests useful comparisons with other cases of strong left parties and non-
consensus based systems, such as Belgium.
7. Conclusion and implications 
This paper has analysed four sets of explanations for board-level employee representa-
tion using the QCA approach. None of the corporate governance factors or political 
factors alone were sufficient to explain codetermination. The strongest evidence was 
for industrial relations factors. Coordinated collective bargaining together with high 
union density proved to be sufficient to explain key cases of codetermination. Coun-
tries where unions are strong and collective bargaining is coordinated on a multi-
employer basis also have enterprise-level codetermination. Some evidence also sup-
ports the legal origins theory. The absence of common law was also shown to be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for codetermination. As such, legal origin does 
not offer a strong explanation for positive cases of codetermination. However, the 
result raises questions as to whether the common law tradition, with it’s emphasis on 
contract rather than statute, in itself presents a significant barrier to codetermination. 
This question is counterfactual and cannot be answered empirically here given the 
limited diversity of existing cases. In particular, no common law countries also coor-
dinated bargaining, a factor that proved sufficient for codetermination.
The strength of QCA analysis is often seen in it’s ability to examine the conjunction 
of multiple causal factors. The analysis here suggested two broad paths to codetermina-
tion. Both paths have certain common elements—coordinated collective bargaining, con-
sensual political systems and concentrated corporate ownership. In the Scandinavian 
group, these factors went together with a very strong political strength of the left through 
strong union density and strong centre-left political parties. In the Germanic group, unions 
and left parties were less strong but investor rights were weaker.
These differences in the political strength of left and degree of investor rights 
suggest some interesting conjectures about the politics of corporate governance 
(Höpner 2003a). In Scandinavia, the strength of unions and left parties allowed a po-
litical compromise with concentrated owners that involved not only codetermination, 
but usually also greater transparency and investor protection. In Germany, the com-
parative weakness of the unions and left led to codetermination rights, but allowed 
concentrated owners to shield themselves from both outside investors and employees 
representatives through less corporate transparency and investor rights. While this is 
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only a conjecture, the QCA results are suggestive for future historically-based com-
parisons of these cases. 
In theoretical and policy terms, the Scandinavian case has strong implications for 
the future of stakeholder models of corporate governance that seek to institutionalise 
strong rights for both shareholders and employees. In particular, these cases contra-
dict the expected negative relationship between employee rights and legal rights for 
shareholders. This may suggest that employee representation may lead countries to 
adopt stronger legal protection for shareholders, either as a way for shareholders to 
counterbalance employee influence or more likely as a response to demands for 
greater transparency by employees themselves.
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DATA APPENDIX 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Employee Representation on the Board: Degree of membership among countries with 
employee representation on corporate boards. Six-point fuzzy scores were assigned based on 
whether law mandate representation (yes/no), its coverage of public/private sector, and the 
strength of employees stipulated within the board. Source: (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 1998) 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES 
Capital Market Activity: A composite variable indicating the level of equity market activity is 
calculated as follows. A three-year average was calculated for domestic share turnover as a 
percentage of total market capitalization in 1995-1997 (World Bank Development Indicators 
database), and then added with the annual average of new issues as a percentage of market 
capitalization for the same period. To take account of substantial differences in size of equity 
markets across OECD countries, the combined trading and new issue data is corrected by 
market size in terms of the ratio of the number of domestic listed firms to population (in mil-
lions), with this information taken from La Porta et al. (1997: Table 2).
M&A Activity: Degree of membership in the group of countries active in domestic and for-
eign acquisitions. The measure includes the six-year average (1990-1995) of acquisitions in US 
million dollars acquired from the SDC dataset, weighted by GDP. Continuous fuzzy scores 
were assigned based on the acquisition percentage of GDP. Source: SDC Platinum™ Worldwide 
Merger, Acquisitions & Alliances, 1990-1995 and GDP from WDB. 
Ownership Concentration: Degree of membership in the group of countries with concen-
trated ownership. Given the difficulties in measuring ownership concentration, this score uses 
two separate measures to derive a ranking. First, data from La Porta et al. (1997) to look at the 
percentage of firms with blockholders with 10%+ and 20%+ stakes across two panels of large 
and medium-sized firms. An average percentage of firms with blockholders was taken across 
the four panels. Second, La Porta et al. (1997) also report the aggregate blocks held by the 
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there largest shareholders. Countries are considered as having high concentration if the size of 
blocks is large and concentration predominates a large proportion of firms. 
Investor Protection: Degree of membership among countries with strong legal rights for 
minority shareholders vis-a-vis managers or blockholders. The measure is an aggregate of five 
dichotomous measures (1=presence of protection, 0=absence of protection): proxy votes 
allowed by mail, shares not blocked before the meeting, cumulative voting or proportional 
representation, and oppressed minorities mechanisms. The sixth measure is percentage of 
share capital call an extraordinary shareholders meeting. Seven-point fuzzy scores were as-
signed by rescaling the final measure (scored zero to 6). (Source: La Porta et al. 1998). 
Accounting Standards: Degree of membership among countries with high standards of ac-
counting and disclosure. Measure based on CIFAR ratings of companies` 1990 annual reports 
based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items. Five-point fuzzy scores were assigned rescaling 
the range of variation (40 to 83 of a possible 90 items) with a cross-over point of 60 items. 
(Source: La Porta et al. 1998). 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS VARIABLES 
Unionization: Degree of membership among countries with high rates of union density. 
Calculations were made based on country averages of the total density figures for the period 
1950-1995 (Golden/Lange 2004). Supplementary data was used from country-specific sources. 
Collective Bargaining Coordination: Degree of membership among countries with centrally 
coordinated collective bargaining regimes. Six-point fuzzy scores were assigned based on an 
average of data provided in Layard et al. (1991) and Calmfors/Driffill (1988) as reported in 
Siaroff (1999).
POLITICAL SYSTEMS VARIABLES 
Centre-left Government: Degree of membership among countries ruled by centre-left gov-
ernments. Measures the percentage of years between 1928 and 1995 where both the party of 
the chief executive and the largest party in congress had left or centre orientation. (Source: Bo-
tero et al. 2004). 
Electoral system/disproportionality. This variable refers to the attributes of the electoral 
system which influences the degree of disproportionality and the number of existing parties. 
The degree of party disproportionality is “the difference between its vote share and its seat 
share” (157). The indexes spans from low mostly in Proportional Representation parliamentary 
systems such as the Netherlands (1.3%) to a high percent in the plurality countries such as the 
U.S. (14.91%) and majority systems such as France (21.08). (Source: Lijphart 1999: 162, Table 
8.2).
Number of Political Parties. This variable measures the mean “number of political parties – 
based on the partisan composition of the lower, and generally most important, house bicameral 
legislatures or the only chamber of unicameral legislatures – averaged over all elections between 
1945 and he middle of 1996” (74). For our sample, it ranges from 5.03 in Finland and 4.91 in 
Italy to 1.96 in New Zealand. Fuzzy membership scores were assigned with the transition point 
of 0.5 located at around 2.5 effective political parties. This number suggests substantively that, on 
average, more than 2 political parties were effective and thus may promote consensus and coali-
tion building within government. (Source: Lijphart 1999: 76, Table 5.2). 
LEGAL SYSTEMS VARIABLES 
Legal Family: Membership in four types of legal families – common law (English origin) or 
civil law (French, German or Scandinavian origin). Crisp set membership scores or 0 or 1 were 
assigned. (Source: La Porta et al. 1998). 
